Abstract-We introduce a variant of the Universal Composability framework (UC; Canetti, FOCS 2001) that uses symbolic cryptography. Two salient properties of the UC framework are secure composition and the possibility of easily defining security by giving an ideal functionality as specification. These advantages are now also available in a symbolic modeling of cryptography, allowing for a modular analysis of complex protocols.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the analysis of cryptographic protocols, symbolic analysis techniques (going back to Dolev and Yao [1] ) have shown to be very fruitful. Symbolic techniques allow for much better automation than techniques working in the computational model (wherein messages are bitstrings and adversaries are runtime-limited computations). In a symbolic model of cryptography, messages are typically modeled as terms in a certain algebra, and the capacities of the adversary are described by, e.g., certain deduction rules over these terms.
In this work, we show how to apply the idea of Universal Composability (UC) [2] to the setting of symbolic cryptography. (The independently developed Reactive Simulatability [3] has the same idea. For simplicity, we only refer to UC in the following.) The Universal Composability framework is a framework for specifying security properties of cryptographic protocols that has the following two salient properties:
• Specifying security properties via functionalities. In the UC framework, the security goals of a protocol are specified by describing a so-called ideal functionality which is a hypothetical entity which, by construction, achieves all the desired security goals. For example, if we wish to ask whether a protocol is a secure communication protocol, we simply specify the secure channel functionality. This very simple functionality just takes a message from Alice, informs the adversary that Alice sent a message, and gives that message to Bob. From the description of the functionality, it is then obvious what properties we achieve: The adversary learns nothing except that a message is delivered (secrecy). The message Bob receives is the same as the one that Alice sent (integrity). Given the description of an ideal functionality, we then call a protocol secure if it "UC-emulates" that functionality. UC-emulation essentially means that the protocol is as secure as the functionality, i.e., that any security property satisfied by the functionality (secrecy and integrity in our example) is also satisfied by the protocol.
Using ideal functionalities to describe what security a protocol achieves is often simpler than explicitly describing all required properties one by one. For example, the security of the Direct Anonymous Attestation protocol [4] is only specified by an ideal functionality. Another view on this definition is one of security preserving refinement. The functionality is an abstract specification, and the protocol is a refinement that preserves security. 1 Note that the fact that UC-emulation preserves security can be formalized: For a certain class of security properties we have that if the functionality has this property, so has any protocol that UC-emulates that functionality. (See Section V).
• Composition and modular design and analysis. Security in the UC framework implies secure composition. That is, assume a secure protocol ρ that uses an ideal functionality F as a building block (e.g., ρ uses a secure channel F). Then, if another protocol π UC emulates F (i.e., π is a message transmission protocol), we can replace F by π in ρ and again get a secure protocol. This composition operation enables the modular design and analysis of a protocol. For example, in Section VII, we show that a variant of the Needham-SchroederLowe protocol NSL [5] UC-emulates the key exchange functionality F KE which gives a secure key to two parties. Another protocol SC UC-emulates the secure channel functionality F SC . And finally, assume we had some complex protocol X implementing some complex functionality F X (think, e.g., of some large ecommerce application), and that X uses secure channels. Then we can plug X, NSL, and SC together, and get a protocol X * that still UC-emulates F X . (And due to the composition theorem, we do not need to verify the composed protocol anew.) In contrast, without the composition theorem, we would have had to analyze X * in one go; that analysis being much more complex because the implementation of the secure channel would be intermixed with the complex protocol X. The composition theorem also has the implication that a protocol will keep its security when run in other, as yet unknown, contexts. This is a very important property, because on the Internet, a protocol will hardly run alone. (Cryptographers often call security definitions that do not have this property "stand-alone models".)
The UC framework has been defined in the context of computational cryptography. However, its two salient properties, security specification via functionalities and secure composition, are as useful in a context where cryptography is modeled symbolically. In particular, even though computer verification in the symbolic setting scales much better than the usually manual verification in the computational setting, most analysis techniques still cannot deal with arbitrarily complex protocols. 2 So being able to design and verify a protocol modularly will allow us to analyze more complex protocols. Our contribution. In this work, we show that the ideas of the UC framework carry over to the symbolic setting. We show that the composition theorem and the fact that security properties carry over still hold in the symbolic UC framework. (Concurrent composition turns out to be non-trivial because we need to encode a special variant of process replication in the applied pi calculus that provides session ids to replicated processes.) We present an example analysis of a key exchange using the Needham-SchroederLowe protocol, and how to use it in a secure channel protocol via composition.
We show that impossibilities from the computational UC framework unfortunately still apply in the symbolic setting; in particular, implementing a commitment functionality without any trusted setup is impossible. On the positive side, we show that this impossibility can be circumvented to a large part by a trick that we call "virtual primitives"; here we perform the proof of security under the assumption that the cryptographic primitives have some exotic features, but in the end conclude security for the original cryptographic prim-itives without these exotic features. This "virtual primitives"-approach is unique to the symbolic setting, to the best of our knowledge no corresponding technique exists in the computational world.
We also show how to use Proverif as a helping tool for performing the observational equivalence proofs when showing security in our framework. For this we develop a set of lemmas that help in rewriting processes and allows us to use Proverif as a tool even for observational equivalence proofs that do not involve so-called biprocesses and are thus out of the scope of Proverif. (These techniques are shown in the example section in the full version [7] only.) We believe that this set of lemmas is useful also in other settings than that of our work. Prior work. The problem of transporting the ideas of the UC framework into the symbolic setting has already been tackled by Delaune, Kremer, and Pereira [8] . They do, however, differ from the original UC framework (and from our work) in one crucial point: In the original framework, the existence of a so-called simulator is required that makes two different protocol executions -the "real and ideal execution" -indistinguishable (this will become clearer later). Instead of indistinguishability, [8] use an observational preorder. That is, everything that can happen in the real world can non-deterministically be matched by the ideal world, but not necessarily vice-versa. This was due to certain problems in constructing simulators when using observational equivalence instead. However, we show that using an observational preorder limits the strength of the security definition considerably. For example, if a functionality guarantees anonymity (e.g., an anonymous broadcast), a protocol that emulates that functionality will not necessarily satisfy anonymity. On the other hand, we show that using observational equivalence instead of an observational preorder gives a stronger definition that does, e.g., preserve anonymity properties. Furthermore, we show that, when designing the functionality according to a simple guideline, the problems with observational equivalence that [8] observed vanish. (However, there are challenges when dealing with concurrent composition that apply only in our setting, and not when using the weaker definition based on observational preorders.) We explain the issues related to [8] in more detail in Section VI.
On the computational side, relevant prior work is of course the UC framework [2] itself. Other models based on the same ideas are Reactive Simulatability (RSIM) [3] , SPPC [9] , IITM [10] , Task-PIOA [11] , [12] , and GNUC [13] . Some of our results are adaptations of existing computational soundness results: the impossibility of commitments [14] and the joint state technique [15] in Section VII. Finally, the symbolic setting is not the first example of the fact that the UC framework can easily adapted to other settings to get different or stronger security guarantees, e.g., GUC (UC with shared functionalities) [16] , quantum-UC [17] , [18], UC Figure 1 . Syntax of processes in the applied pi calculus with local adversaries [19] , UC/c (incoercibility) [20] , UC with everlasting security [21] . Furthermore, links between UC and symbolic models occurred where UC-like models were used to establish computational soundness results [22] , [23] . Outlook. Further research might tackle the following points:
• Using our framework for analyzing the security of existing protocols. A particular interesting candidate is the Direct Anonymous Attestation protocol [4] because its security is already formulated in a UC model. • Although we partially used Proverif for some of the proof steps, the analysis of our example protocols still used a lot of manual work. Can the verification of symbolic UC security be automated? • There are extensions of the UC framework. For example [20] provides an extension that captures incoercibility. That model could be translated to the symbolic setting and used for the analysis of voting protocols.
• In combination with computational soundness results (these are results that show that symbolic security in certain cases implies computational security), the virtual primitives approach could be a viable new technique for showing computational security: Design the protocol symbolically modularly using virtual primitives, and then carry the security over to the computational setting. Organization. In Section II we review the applied pi calculus as used here (with some additional concepts introduced in Section II-A). Section III introduces our security definition. Section IV shows the composition theorem, Section V that we have property preservation. In Section VII we give an example of our framework based on the NeedhamSchroeder-Lowe protocol, we illustrate composition and joint state techniques (the latter is a technique for dealing with functionalities shared by several protocol instances). Finally, in Section VIII we present the virtual primitives technique.
The Appendix contains some delayed details. However, we decided to omit the proofs to make this paper more handy and printer friendly. A full version including all the proofs is available online [7] .
II. REVIEW OF THE APPLIED PI CALCULUS
In this section we very briefly review the syntax and semantics of the applied pi calculus from [24] which is used throughout this paper. A more detailed review can be found in the full version [7] .
In our calculus terms take up the role of data (messages), while processes (following the grammar in Figure 1 ) model functional behavior. 0 is a process that does nothing, !P is an unbounded number of copies of P , P |Q is P and Q in parallel, M (x) waits for a message on channel M and assigns it to x, M N outputs N on channel M , let x = D in P else Q evaluates the destructors in D, assigns the result to x and continues with P (or Q if a destructor fails). A signature Σ consists of function symbols which we split in constructors and destructors. A term is either a name, a variable or the application of a constructor to terms. We define the semantic of terms in two ways: One is the equational theory which induces equivalence classes on the set of terms and is defined by set of equations E. The other is a set of rewrite rules R defining the mechanics of destructors. Each rule defines the result of a specific application of a destructor. We call the entity of a signature, a set of equations and a set of rewrite rules a symbolic model. Except for Section VIII, it will be clear from the context which symbolic model we use. In Section VIII we focus on the relation between different symbolic models. Only then we will introduce a notation that explicitly states the symbolic model underlying a property, e.g., observational equivalence of two processes.
With fn(P ), bn(P ), fv , bv (P ) we denote the free names, bound names, free variables and bound variables of a process respectively. Analogously for terms. We introduce the usual relations on processes: structural equivalence (≡), internal reduction (P → P ′ ) means that P ′ is the immediate successor process of P in an execution and observational equivalence (≈) which intuitively means that no context can distinguish the two processes. D ⇓ M means that the destructor term D evaluates to the term M .
A. Additional concepts used in this work
In this section, we describe several nonstandard concepts related to the applied pi calculus that we use in this work. Miscellaneous. A context always contains a single occurrence of the hole. Sometimes we need a context which may or may not contain a hole: A 0-1-context is defined like a context, except that there may be zero or one occurrences of the hole.
We refer to occurrences of terms that identify channels in a process as channel identifiers. E.g., in M T M is a channel identifier and T is not -even if M and T were the same term (because M and T are different occurrences). Natural symbolic models. A number of lemmas in this paper only hold when the symbolic model we use satisfies certain natural conditions. Instead of stating these explicitly each time, we collect all these conditions in the following definition: Definition 2.1 (Natural symbolic model) : We say a symbolic model is natural if it satisfies the following conditions:
(i) there is a constructor empty/0 ∈ Σ, (ii) a constructor for pairings, denoted ( , ), is part of the signature Σ, (iii) there is a destructor equals/2 ∈ Σ with rewrite rule equals(x , x ) → x and no further rewrite rules that contain equals, (iv) there are destructors fst/1, snd /1 ∈ Σ with rewrite rules fst((x , y)) → x and snd ((x , y)) → y, (v) for all terms T , T 1 with fst(T ) ⇓ T 1 there exists a term T 2 with snd (T ) ⇓ T 2 and furthermore (T 1 , T 2 ) = E T for all such T 2 and vice versa, (vi) for arbitrary terms
(vii) for any destructor term D and any name n ∈ fn(D) we require that D ⇓ T for a term T entails the existence of a term
In the following, we will always assume that the symbolic model is natural in the sense of Definition 2.1. Equivalence of processes modulo rewriting. Structural equivalence ≡ does not allow us to replace a term M by another term M ′ = E M . In some places, we will therefore need to apply = E to processes, and we will also use an extension ≡ E of ≡ that allows us to replace terms: 
Formally, = E is the smallest equivalence relation on destructor terms such that D{M/x} = E D{M ′ /x} for destructor terms D and terms M = E M ′ . Given two processes P, P ′ , we have P = E P ′ iff P can be rewritten into P ′ by α-conversion and by replacing terms and destructor terms by = E -equivalent ones. Formally, = E is the smallest equivalence relation closed under α-renaming such that P {M/x} = E P {M ′ /x} for processes P and terms M = E M ′ . Given two processes P, P ′ , we have P ≡ E P ′ iff P can be rewritten into P ′ by = E and ≡. Formally,
* . Full observational equivalence. A substitution σ is a closing substitution if P σ is closed. We call two (not necessarily closed) processes P and Q fully observationally equivalent (denoted P ∼ ∼ ∼ Q) iff P σ ≈ Qσ for all closing substitutions σ (where we implicitly assume that the bound names in P, Q are renamed so that they are distinct from the free names of σ). Since ≈ is closed under ≡ it follows in a straightforward way that ∼ ∼ ∼ is closed under ≡.
The motivation behind the definition of ∼ ∼ ∼ is the following lemma which allows us to replace fully observationally equivalent subprocesses by each other. Lemma 2.3: Let P and Q be processes and P ∼ ∼ ∼ Q. Then
for every context C. Product processes. In order to argue about concurrent composition, as a technical tool, we will need an extension of the applied pi calculus that supports infinite parallel compositions of processes which are tagged with distinct terms.
Intuitively, the indexed replication x∈S P stands for P {s 1 /x}|P {s 2 /x}| . . . when S = {s 1 , s 2 , . . . }. (Like !P stands for P |P | . . . .) We call processes from this extended calculus product processes. Note that our main definitions and results are still stated with respect to the original calculus from [24] ; we only use product processes in some specific situations. Definition 2.4 (Product processes): Product processes are defined by the grammar in Figure 1 with the additional construct x ∈S P where x is a variable, S a (possibly infinite) set of terms, and P a product process. (We call x ∈S P an indexed replication.) (Note that we consider x∈S to be a binder. I.e., in x∈S P , we consider x a bound variable.) Structural equivalence (≡) on product processes is defined as on processes.
The reduction relation → on product processes is defined using the same rules as on processes, with the following additional rule (IREPL):
(Essentially S is treated as a set of session ids which contains each sid at most once modulo = E .)
Observational equivalence (≈) on product processes is defined like observational equivalence on processes.
Notice that processes are also product processes, and that on processes, the new definitions of ≡, →, and ≈ coincide with the original definitions. (See the full version [7] for precise definitions.)
III. SYMBOLIC UC

Intuition.
We start by presenting the intuition that underlies the original UC framework [2] and thus also our work. The basic idea is to define security of a protocol π by comparing it to a so-called ideal functionality F. The ideal functionality is a machine that by definition does what the protocol should achieve. For example, if the task of the protocol is to transmit a message m securely from Alice to Bob, then the functionality is a trusted machine that expects a message m from Alice over a secure channel, sends to the adversary that such a message was received (but does not send the message itself), and then after the adversary allows delivery, forwards the message to Bob. (In the applied pi calculus, this functionality would be net scstart ().io A (x).(net notify | net deliver ().io B x ) where the net ... -channels belong to the adversary; see Definition 5.2 below.) In a sense, the functionality is an abstract specification of the protocol behavior, and the protocol is supposed to be a concrete instantiation of that specification using crypto, in a way that preserves the security properties of the specification. So how to model that a protocol π is as secure as a functionality F? The basic idea is to ensure that any attack on π is also possible on F. Since by assumption F does not allow any attacks, this implies that π does not allow any attacks either, so π is secure. To model that any attack on π is possible on F, we require that for any adversary attacking π, there is a corresponding adversary (the "simulator") attacking F that performs an equivalent attack. And what do we mean by equivalent? Any "environment" that can observe the overall protocol outcome (inputs and outputs), and that can talk to the adversary (i.e., it learns what secret information the adversary might have obtained), cannot distinguish between the two attacks. In other words, for any adversary A, there is a simulator S such that for all environments Z, we have that π + A + Z (the protocol running with A and Z) and F + S + Z are indistinguishable from Z's point of view. Notice that we do not wish to allow Z to observe the internal protocol communication -doing so would require that π and F work the same way internally, but we only want that the two have the same "observable effects", we do not care about their inner workings. Due to this, in a formal definition, we need to distinguish between the protocol-internal communication channels (net-channels), and the protocol's interface (iochannels). Only the latter is accessible to the environment. Formal definition. To formalize the above intuition in the applied pi calculus, we first formalize the distinction between channels that make up the protocol's input/output interface, and those that make up the protocol's internal channels. We partition the set of all names into two sets IO and NET (both infinite). We will then require adversaries and simulators to only communicate on NET channels. (We do not forbid the environment to access NET channels. But we will give the adversary/simulator the ability to rename and hide NET channels, and thus effectively protect the protocol's NET channels from the environment.)
In order to keep the distinction between NET-channels and IO-channels, we also want to avoid that NET-channels are transmitted to the environment (we use this in a few places in our proofs): Definition 3.1: We call a process P NET-stable if every name n ∈ NET ∩ fn(P ) in P occurs only in channel identifiers (i.e., in particular, P does not send n to the environment).
Note that there is no restrictions on the bound names. Thus a NET-stable adversary is free to share arbitrary fresh names with the environment and to use them as channels.
We now define the concept of an adversary. Essentially, an adversary is just a process A that is intended to interact with the protocol (or functionality). Since the adversary connects to the protocol over some NET-names, the specification of the adversary additionally includes a list of NET-names n of the protocol that will be accessed by A (and are thus private between A and the protocol). Finally, an adversary/simulator sometimes needs to rename NET-channels of the protocol/functionality to avoid name clashes. Since NETchannels are protocol internal and not part of the externally visible interface, it should not matter whether the same name is used in protocol and functionality or not. This is achieved by letting the adversary rename NET-names, we model this by specifying a renaming ϕ as part of the adversary. Definition 3.2: An adversary is a triple (A, ϕ, n) where A is a closed NET-stable process with IO ∩ fn(A) = ∅, ϕ : NET → NET a bijection and n a list of names n ⊆ NET.
We can now state our security definition. Both protocol and functionality are modeled by processes P and Q, respectively. An adversary (A, ϕ A , n A ) connecting to P is modeled as νn A .(P ϕ A |A), as we would expect from the meaning of ϕ and n explained above. To model that P emulates Q, we would require that νn A .(P ϕ A |A) and νn S .(Qϕ S |S) are indistinguishable for any environment for a suitable simulator (S, ϕ S , n S ). We do not need to specify the environment explicitly because we have the notion of observational equivalence:
means that no context can distinguish the left and right hand side. The following definition captures this, except that we make one simplification: Instead of quantifying over all adversaries (A, ϕ A , n A ), we fix A := 0, ϕ A the identity, and n A the empty list, so that νn A .(P ϕ A |A) = P . (Such an adversary, that essentially just leaves all NETchannels accessible to the environment, is usually called a dummy adversary.) This definition is often technically much simpler to handle, and Lemma 3.4 below guarantees that it is equivalent to the more natural definition that quantifies over all adversaries. Definition 3.3: Let P and Q be processes. We say P emulates Q (written P ≤ Q) iff there exists an adversary (S, ϕ, n) such that P ∼ ∼ ∼ νn.(Qϕ|S). (S, ϕ, n) will often be called simulator.
We use ∼ ∼ ∼ instead of ≈ to get a more general definition, allowing non-closed P, Q. For the applications presented in this paper, the special case using ≈ (which is equivalent to our definition restricted to closed processes) is sufficient. (Note however that we would still use ∼ ∼ ∼ to state various technical lemmas more conveniently.)
Note that there is no formal distinction between protocols and functionalities. Indeed, it can sometimes be convenient to compare two protocols P, Q. Furthermore, note that ≤ is weaker than ∼ ∼ ∼ : P ∼ ∼ ∼ Q entails P ≤ Q (and Q ≤ P ) with the simulator (0, id , ∅).
As observed in [25] there are several approaches to define simulation based security. The following Lemma shows that our definition (resembling strong simulatability) is equivalent to the two alternatives: black-box simulatability and universally-composable simulatability (the latter being the definition that corresponds directly to the intuition given at the beginning of this section). Lemma 3.4: For processes P , Q we have that the following are equivalent:
(i) strong simulatability:
where all triples are adversaries according to Definition 3.2. Lemma 3.5 (Reflexivity, transitivity): Let P, Q, R be processes. Then P ≤ P . And if P ≤ Q and Q ≤ R, then P ≤ R. Corruption. So far, we have not yet modeled the ability of the adversary to corrupt parties. There are two main variants of corruption: static and adaptive corruption. In the case of static corruption, it is determined in the beginning of the protocol who is corrupted. For adaptive corruption, corruption may occur during the protocol and depend on protocol messages. Modeling static corruption is quite easy in our model: When a party X is corrupted, we simply remove the subprocess P X corresponding to that party from the protocol P , make all NET-names occurring in P X public, and -in the case of a functionality -additionally rename all IO-names of P X into NET-names. For example, if P = νnet 1 net 2 .(P A |P B |F) where net 1 occurs in P A and P B and net 2 only in P B , and F has IO-names io FA , io FB then corrupting A leads to
And a functionality G with IO-names io
So, if we want to verify that a P emulates G for any corruption, we need to check:
An example is given in Section VIII-A in the case of UC secure commitments.
Modeling adaptive corruptions is more complex. For this one would need to introduce special parties that react to a special signal from the environment and then switch into a corrupted mode. We do not follow that approach here.
IV. COMPOSITION
One of the salient properties of the UC framework is composition. Assume a protocol π UC-emulates a functionality F. And ρ is a protocol using F. Then ρ π/F (which is ρ with F replaced by π) UC-emulates ρ. And hence, by transitivity, if ρ emulates some functionality G, ρ π/F UC-emulates G. In our context, ideally we would like a composition theorem such as P ≤ Q =⇒ C[P ] ≤ C[Q] for arbitrary contexts C. Unfortunately, the situation is not as simple. A simple observation is that if C may contain NET-names, then composition will not work: For example, assume P ≤ Q, and P is a protocol using some NET-channel net to implement an ideal functionality Q (which does not use net). And C = |R receives on a NET-channel net and outputs the received messages on an IO-channel io. Then C[P ] will output protocol-internal messages on io (observable to the environment), while C[Q] will not (since the functionality Q will not use the channel net).
(We give a formal analysis of the various cases in which the composition theorem does not hold in Appendix A of the full version [7] .) Thus a first condition on C is that it may not use the same NET-names. In fact, we show below (Theorem 4.10) that if C is an evaluation context binding only IO-names and not using any of the NET-names of P, Q, then
This already allows for a large range of composition operations. (In particular, we can connect different protocols through their interfaces securely by composing them in parallel, and restricting the IO-channels through which they are connected.) But one important operation is missing, namely concurrent composition. Concurrent composition means that if P ≤ Q, then P ′ ≤ Q ′ where P ′ consists of many instances of P and Q ′ analogously. Such a result is important in many cases, e.g., if P is a single session key-exchange, but an embedding protocol needs a large number of keys. The most obvious way to model this in our setting would be a theorem stating P ≤ Q =⇒ !P ≤ !Q.
Unfortunately, such a theorem cannot hold, either. The intuitive reason is as follows: When trying to construct a simulator for !Q, then this simulator will not be able to distinguish messages from different instances of Q. The simulator will then be unable to even decide whether he talks to a single instance or several. For example:
Here we have P ≤ Q because a simulator receiving empty on net 2 or net 3 just has to replace it by some fresh name m. However, we do not have !P ≤ !Q. Depending on the messages the environment sends on io 2 , !P will output either the same name m on net 2 , net 3 , or different names m, m ′ . However, a simulator interacting with !Q in both cases gets empty, empty on net 2 , net 3 . The simulator then does not know whether he should change this into m, m or m, m ′ for fresh m, m ′ . Thus the simulator fails. (The formal argument is in Appendix A of the full version [7] .)
So we cannot have a theorem stating P ≤ Q =⇒ !P ≤ !Q. Does this mean concurrent composition is not possible? No, just that ! is not the right operator to model it. In the computational UC framework, composition also does not involve a number of indistinguishable instances. Instead, each instance of P and Q is given a unique session id, and all communication is tagged with that session id so that it can be routed to the right instance. In our setting, one possibility to achieve this is to define an operator !! [26] such that !!P behaves like an unlimited number of instances of P , where each instance is tagged with a unique session id sid . I.e., each channel C in P is replaced by (sid , C).
3
The question is how to define !!P . The applied pi calculus does not have any construct that conveniently allows to perform infinite branching with different ids. Thus, we have to work around this restriction by introducing a more elaborate construction. As a first step, we define the tagged version P ((M )) of the process P : Definition 4.1: Let P be a process, and let M be a term. We write P ((M )) for P with every occurrence of C (x ) replaced by (M , C )(x ) and every occurrence of C T replaced by (M , C ) T . (If M contains bound variables or bound names from P , we assume that these bound variables/names are first renamed in P .)
Now we have to somehow define !!P as P ((s 1 ))|P ((s 2 ))| . . . where s 1 , s 2 , . . . range over some infinite set SID of session ids. Using product processes (see Section II-A) this is easy: !!P := x∈SID P ((x)) does the job. However, product processes are a nonstandard extension of the applied pi calculus, but we wish to stay compatible with existing variants (in particular, to be able to use Proverif for verification). Thus, instead of using x∈SID P ((x)), we define a suitable context C such that C[P ((x))] behaves like x∈SID P ((x)). Then we can define !!P := C[P ((x))]. Of course, depending on the particular set SID we choose, a different context C will be needed. Instead of fixing a particular one, we thus give a general definition what contexts are suitable for a given set SID, and from then on, just assume an arbitrary such context. Definition 4.2 (Indexing context): Given a set S of terms, a variable x (will be used for tagging), and names n, we call a closed context C x ,n with bn(C x ,n ) = n and fn(C x ,n ) = ∅ (not containing indexed replications) an S-indexing context iff for all processes P with x ∈ bv (P ) 4 and n ∩ fn(P ) = ∅ we have
In the following, we fix a set SID of terms containing no names or variables. The set SID will represent the set of all session IDs. We assume that id = E id ′ entails id = id 
is a factory with parameters x and a for tagged instances of P that realizes the abstract construction of x∈SID bits P ((x)). The following lemma formalizes this fact:
is an SID bits -indexing context. We stress that C SID bits x ,a is just one example of an indexing context. From now on SID is an arbitrary but fixed set of indexes and C SID x ,n an arbitrary but fixed SID-indexing context according to Definition 4.2. All our results then hold independently of the particular choice of SID.
We can now finally define !!P : Definition 4.5 (Indexed replication): Let P be a process. We define !! x P := C SID x ,n [P ((x ))] for some arbitrary n with n ∩ fn(P ) = ∅. We write !!P for !! x P with x ∈ (fv (P ) ∪ bv (P )).
Notice that our definition is a bit more general, we can even write !! x P , in this case P will have access to the sid via the variable x. We need this added flexibility in Section VII-C for the protocol KE * . Note that since C SID x ,n [P ((x ))] ∼ ∼ ∼ x∈S P ((x)) by definition, we can actually think of !! x P as being defined as x∈S P ((x)). Our definition, however, has the advantage that !! x P is actually a process in the original calculus, the concept of product processes was only used as a tool for defining !!. On real-life implementations of !!. When implementing a process !!P in real life (i.e., in software for actual deployed protocols), a process such as !!c(x).P ′ is probably best implemented by a process that listens on c for messages of the form (sid , m). Whenever such a message is received, a new instance of P ′ with session id sid is spawned, and all further messages with that sid are routed to that instance of P ′ . On the other hand, a process such as !!c M .P Properties of !!. The following four lemmas state several important properties of !!. We will need these to prove the composition theorem below. Lemmas 4.6, 4.7, and 4.9 also hold for ! instead of !!. But Lemma 4.8 is specific to !!, and is crucial for enabling the composition theorem. Lemma 4.6: Let P be a process and ϕ : N → N be a permutation on names. Then (!! x P )ϕ ≡ !! x (P ϕ) for all variables x ∈ bv (P ). Lemma 4.7: Let P , Q be processes. Then P ∼ ∼ ∼ Q ⇒ !! x P ∼ ∼ ∼ !! x Q for all variables x ∈ bv (P ) ∪ bv (Q). Lemma 4.8: Let P be a process and n be a name that occurs only in channel identifiers in P . Then νn.!! x P ∼ ∼ ∼ !! x νn.P for all variables x ∈ bv (P ). Lemma 4.9: Let P and Q be processes. Then
Out of these four lemmas, Lemma 4.7 was surprisingly hard to prove. We very roughly sketch the proof idea here: The main thing to show is that P ≈ Q =⇒ P ((M )) ≈ Q((M )) for arbitrary fixed M . To show this, we define an operation untag that maps P ((M )) to P , i.e., removes the tag M from all channels. Then we wish to prove that the following relation is a bisimulation: ∼ S sid := {(P , Q) : untag(P ) ≈ untag(Q)}. Once we have that, we see that P ((M )) ∼ S sid Q((M )) and hence P ((M )) ≈ Q((M )). Unfortunately, ∼ S sid is not really a bisimulation. A bisimulation must be closed under evaluation contexts, even under contexts in which not all channels are tagged with M . To solve this problem, we tweak untag in such a way that nontagged channels C are mapped to specially marked channels (using a special name n sid ) which can then be mapped back to C when tagging again. And we need to tweak the notion of a bisimulation slightly, so that ∼ S sid only needs to be closed under evaluation contexts on which our operation untag works properly. These tweaks lead to an unexpectedly complex proof of Lemma 4.7. Alternative definitions of !! !! !!. Of course, our definition of !!P is not the only possible definition of a replication with session ids. For example, one might try to define !!P in such a way that an instance of P is spawned for arbitrary terms as sessions id, not only terms in some fixed set SID. In particular, a fresh name could then be used as session id which is not possible with our modeling. (Then, of course, the set of processes to which !! may be applied should be restricted to processes which wait for an input before doing anything. Otherwise processes could spawn spontaneously that use some other process' fresh names as session ids.)
Any definition of !! that satisfies Lemmas 4.6-4.9 would lead to the same composition theorem. (If that definition !! is applicable only to a certain set P of processes, we additionally need that P is closed under parallel composition, restrictions, renaming, and !!, and that the definition of ≤ (Definition 3.3) is with respect to simulators in P.) The composition theorem. We can now state and prove the composition theorem. It says that if P ≤ Q, we can restrict the IO-names, compose in parallel with processes that have disjoint NET-names, rename names (as long as NET-and IO-names are not interchanged), and perform concurrent composition. Theorem 4.10 (Composition Theorem): Let P , Q be processes with P ≤ Q. Then (i) For any list of names io ⊆ IO we have νio.P ≤ νio.Q. (ii) For any process R with (fn(R) ∩ (fn(P ) ∪ fn(Q))) ⊆ IO we have P |R ≤ Q|R. (iii) For any permutation ψ : NET → NET we have P ψ ≤ Q and P ≤ Qψ. (iv) For any permutation ψ : IO → IO we have P ψ ≤ Qψ.
V. PROPERTY PRESERVATION
Besides secure composition, the second salient property of the UC framework is the fact that security properties of the ideal functionality F automatically carry over to any protocol emulating F. For example, a secure channel functionality that takes a message m from Alice and gives it directly to Bob will obviously have the property that m stays secret. Then, if π UC-emulates F, any message given to π will also stay secret. A similar property preservation law holds in our case, the following theorem formalizes it: Theorem 5.1 (Property preservation): Let P, Q be processes with P ≤ Q. Let E 1 and E 2 be contexts whose holes are protected only by parallel compositions (|), restrictions (ν), and indexed replications (!! x ). Assume that E 1 , E 2 do not contain NET-names (neither bound nor free). Assume that the number of !! x (possibly with different x) over the hole is the same in E 1 and E 2 .
If
Thus, any security property that can be expressed by an indistinguishability game of the form "E 1 [P ] ∼ ∼ ∼ E 2 [P ]" with E 1 , E 2 as in the theorem will carry over from the ideal functionality Q to the protocol P , given P ≤ Q. Note that even many trace based properties can be expressed in such a way. E.g., if we want to say that E 1 [P ] does not raise an event bad (modeled by emitting on a special channel), we just define E 2 to be like E 1 , but without the event. Then [7] . By Theorem 5.1 (and using that ≈ and ∼ ∼ ∼ coincide for closed processes), we have
Anonymity properties are modeled very similarly, except that instead of different payloads n 1 , n 2 , different user ids are provided to the two processes. Example: Unlinkability. The next example is strong unlinkability [27] . This property requires that the adversary cannot distinguish whether every user runs only one session of a protocol, or whether every user runs many sessions. Formally: !νid .!νsid .P ≈ !νid .νsid .P if we assume that P contains free names id , sid for the user id and the session id. At a first glance, such a property seems to be excluded by the restriction of Theorem 5.1 that E 1 , E 2 may not have a ! over their hole. This is, however, not the case if protocol P (and the functionality Q) are modeled suitably, namely if P is already a multi-session protocol. For example, if P expects a pair of user id and session id on an IO-channel init for each session to be run, then strong unlinkability can be expressed as follows: Definition 5.4: A protocol P has strong unlinkability iff
Then Theorem 5.1 guarantees that if Q has strong unlinkability and P ≤ Q, then P has strong unlinkability.
Notice that if we model a different session id mechanism, we also need a different definition. For example, if P and Q are constructed using the !! operator, session ids will be part of the channel name (we would have channels such as (sid , (id , init) 
)). The variant described above seems most realistic for unlinkability, though, because !! includes session ids in the clear in all network-messages, so constructing unlinkable protocols by concurrent composition of individual sessions using !! does not seem to work well.
In Appendix A of the full version [7] we show that the various restrictions in Theorem 5.1 are necessary. In particular, property preservation for contexts E 1 , E 2 having a ! over their hole (instead of a !!) does not hold. The reasons are similar to those that forbid ! in the composition theorem (cf. Section IV). This is another indicate that an operator like !! is more natural in this context.
VI. RELATION TO DELAUNE-KREMER-PEREIRA
DKP-security.
As mentioned in the introduction, Delaune, Kremer, and Pereira [8] have already presented a variant of the UC model in the applied pi calculus. In this section, we describe the differences between their and our model, and why these differences are necessary to achieve stronger security results.
In [8] , security is defined as follows: Definition 6.1 (DKP-security): Let (observational preorder) be the largest simulation (not bisimulation).
Let P, Q be processes. Then P ≤ SS Q iff there exists a simulator S (a context) such that P S [Q] .
Here a simulator S is an evaluation context subject to certain conditions, see [8] , notably that it only binds NETnames.
Notice that in this definition, the main difference to our definition is that P and S[Q] do not have to be observationally equivalent, but only observationally preordered. (Also, the notion of the simulator S is somewhat different from ours, but not in essence.) The effect of this is that the simulator may introduce additional non-determinism. For example, in our model, if the protocol P can take one out of two actions, the simulator needs to simulate the appropriate action, he thus needs to figure out which of the two actions is taken. With respect to DKP-security, the simulator can just non-deterministically choose which action to take; the observational preorder takes care that the right action is taken in the right situation. This makes simulators for DKPsecurity much easier to construct and DKP-security into a considerably weaker notion.
DKP-security satisfies similar laws as our notion. In particular, ≤ SS is reflexive and transitive and it satisfies a composition theorem (which differs from ours mainly in that P ≤ SS Q =⇒ !P ≤ SS !Q holds, no need to introduce !!). They do not state a property preservation theorem. We believe, though, that their DPK-security supports property preservation for certain kinds of trace properties.
5
The problem with observational preorder. We explain why we believe that a definition based on observational preorder instead of equivalence does not give sufficient security guarantees. We illustrate this by the following example. Consider a simple functionality that is supposed to model an insecure but anonymous channel:
Obviously, this functionality preserves anonymity about whether Alice or Bob sends a message (i.e., whether an input on io A or io B occurs). Formally:
(In fact, we even have ≡.) Now consider a naive protocol in which Alice and Bob send their message over distinct channels net A , net B . Formally:
5 Probably a law of the following kind holds: Assume P ≤ SS Q. Let c / ∈ fv (P, Q), and E be a context satisfying certain properties. Then
Compare with Theorem 5.1 which can deal with indistinguishability properties.
Obviously, P does not provide anonymity, it is easy to see that νio A io B .(io A T |P ) ≈ νio A io B .(io B T |P ). Consequently (Theorem 5.1), we have P ≤ F anon as we would expect since P gives less security than F anon .
On the other hand, with respect to DKP-security, P is considered as secure as F anon , i.e., P ≤ SS F anon . We use the following simulator: S := net(x).net A x | net(x).net B x | . Then P S[F anon ] because S relays messages sent on net onto net A or net B , and the definition of makes sure that the message is non-deterministically delivered on the right channel net A or net B . Hence P ≤ SS F anon . Lemma 6.2 (with non-rigorous proof): P ≤ SS F anon . Thus, the security of a protocol in the sense of [8] does not imply that the protocol has the same anonymity properties as the ideal functionality. The same probably holds for other equivalence properties such as strong secrecy etc. We consider this a strong restriction of the notion and thus believe that a symbolic analogue to UC security should use observational equivalence or a similar notion of equivalence. Why observational preorder? The reader may wonder why [8] use observational preorder instead of observational equivalence, in particular since observational equivalence is the more direct analogue to the indistinguishability in the computational UC framework [2] . We explain the reasons as we understand them (this is based both on explanations in [8] and on our own insights while working on the current result), and due to what definitional decisions we managed to get around those reasons:
• It is not possible to model "relays". That is, if we have a process P that outputs on a channel c, then as a technical tool we might wish to construct a process R (a relay) that forwards all message on c to another channel c ′ , i.e., we want νc.(P |R) ≈ P {c ′ /c}. Unfortunately, such a relay does not seem to exist in the applied pi calculus. R :=!c(x).c ′ x does not work. Consider, e.g., P := c n .a n . Then νc.(P |R) ↓ a but P {c ′ /c} ↓ a . With respect to , however, we can have relays (P {c ′ /c} νc.(P |R)). Why are relays important? One reason is whether a dummy adversary exists. Such a dummy adversary is an adversary that forwards all messages on NETchannels from the protocol to the environment and vice versa. (So, essentially, a relay.) The existence of the dummy adversary is used implicitly or explicitly in most structural theorems (reflexivity, transitivity, concurrent composition). In fact, it seems that when using observational equivalence in [8] , one would not even have reflexivity. We get around this problem by using a slightly different definition of adversaries/simulators (Definition 3.2). In our setting, a dummy can be trivially constructed as (0, ϕ, ∅) where ϕ just renames the protocol's NETchannels to the NET-channels that the environment expects the messages on. This simple trick obviates the need for using relays in the construction of the dummy adversary.
• The second problem is that one does not get a composition theorem that guarantees P ≤ SS Q =⇒ !P ≤ SS !Q when using observational equivalence. However, we believe that this is a natural limitation because we can show that property preservation does not even hold for equivalence-based security properties that replicate the protocol. Thus we cannot expect to get such a composition theorem and simultaneously have property preservation for equivalence properties. We get around this problem by defining a different notion of concurrent composition, using the !! operator (see Section IV).
• Finally, the non-existence of relays is a problem when proving the security of concrete protocols P ≤ F: A typical thing a simulator has to do is to take a message m on a NET-channel and somehow rewrite it (e.g., to enc(k, m)) before sending it on to the environment. This, of course, is a generalization of the concept of a relay. Thus, if relays are impossible, we can hardly expect to construct sensible simulators. This, however, is not true if we pay some attention in the definition of the functionality and obey the following guideline: Guideline: When designing a functionality, use different names for all NET-channels and, whenever sending something on a NET-channel C, use C T |P ′ instead of C T .R.
In these cases, R :=!c(x).c ′ x will usually work as a relay (e.g., νc.(P |R) ≈ P {c ′ /c} for P := c n |a n ).
VII. EXAMPLE: SECURE CHANNELS
In this section we apply symbolic UC hands on. We illustrate how our results from Section IV can be usefully applied in practice to construct a secure channel from the widely known NSL protocol and a PKI. Furthermore, when extending the secure channel to multiple sessions, we present an example for a joint state, i.e., multiple instances of one protocol that jointly use one instance of another functionality. While the original UC model of Canetti [2] requires an additional theorem to handle joint states [15] , we can directly use !! in our case. We used Proverif 6 for our proofs as much as possible to show how it helps with the verification of various properties in the context of symbolic UC.
In this section, we only consider an example where we assume all parties to be honest (as the goal of secure channels is to protect from an outside adversary). For an example with corruption, see Section VIII.
We first define the symbolic model used in this section. The constructors are: penc/3, pk /1, sk /1, senc/3, (·, ·), hash/1, and empty/0, representing public-key encryption, public and secret keys, symmetric encryption, pairs, hashing, and empty messages, respectively. Encryption has a third argument modeling randomness used for encrypting. More specifically, penc(pk (k), m, r) models a public key encryption using key pk (k), plaintext m, and randomness r, and senc(k, m, r) a symmetric encryption using key k, plaintext m, and randomness r. We believe that senc without the additional randomness argument r would also work in our setting. However, we introduce this additional nonce to help Proverif, which can then better distinguish ciphertexts (e.g., one of the Proverif scripts in the proof of Lemma 7.6 fails without r due to Proverif's overapproximation technique).
We have no equations in our theory.
Furthermore we have the destructors pdec/2, sdec/2, pkofsk /1, and pkofenc/1, modeling public-key decryption, symmetric decryption, extraction of a public key from a secret key, and extraction of a public key from a ciphertext. (The latter two are not needed in our protocols, but we provide them to make the adversary more realistic.) The behavior of the destructors is specified by the following rewrite rules:
A. Key exchange using NSL
With the symbolic model set up we next show how to tailor a UC-secure key exchange from NSL using a PKI functionality F PKI . Towards this goal we model the ideal key exchange functionality F KE , the PKI F PKI and the NSL protocol based on F PKI as follows: Definition 7.1 (Key exchange functionality): ((x sk , _, x pk B ) ).νn a .νr 1 .
Definition 7.2 (Public key infrastructure functionality):
F PKI := νk a k b .io pkeA (sk (k a ), pk (k a ), pk (k b )) | io pkeB (sk (k b ), pk (k a ), pk (k b )) | net pke (pk (k a ), pk (k b ))
Definition 7.3 (Needham-Schroeder-Lowe):
net nslA penc(x pk B , n a , r 1 ) .net nslA (x c ).
io ka hash((n a , x n b )) NSL B := io pkeB ((x sk , x pk A , _)).net nslB (x c ).
The differences to the original NSL protocol [5] are: The original protocol includes A's identity in the first message, and the original protocol does not specify what to do with the nonces n a , n b , while we use them to derive a key hash ((n a , n b ) ). Also, [5] also presents an extended version of the protocol that explicitly communicates with a server S for getting the keys for Alice and Bob. We could get this extended protocol by proving that this retrieval protocol implements F PKI , and then composing our NSL protocol with the retrieval protocol.
We can now state the first result of this section, namely that the NSL is a UC-secure realization of F KE . Lemma 7.4: NSL ≤ F KE .
The proof of this lemma is given in the full version [7] . We only show the simulator (S, ϕ, n) here:
B. Secure channel from key exchange.
Next, we realize a secure channel. Since we already have a realization of a secure key exchange at hand, we realize the secure channel SC from the idealized key exchange F KE . Later we replace F KE by NSL. Definition 7.5 (Secure channel protocol):
The proof of this lemma is given in the full version [7] . We only show the simulator (S, ϕ, n) here: We did construct a secure channel from a PKI using the NSL protocol. More interesting than this result is the way we achieved it: We did not have to analyze the complete system C[NSL] in one piece but could replace the NSL protocol with an idealized functionality. This illustrates two striking advantages of the UC approach:
• The fact that NSL realizes an ideal key exchange can be re-used for security proofs of further systems.
• We cannot only plug NSL into C but any protocol that realizes a secure key exchange (e.g., if no PKI is available and thus NSL is not an option). Instead of one monolithic security proof for C[NSL] we end up with smaller proofs and results which can be used flexibly. Furthermore, to split the security analysis of a complex system into smaller parts might be the only feasible option to tackle it at all.
C. Generating many keys from one
While the example until now illustrates composition and the power of UC, C[NSL] only realizes a single-use secure channel. To transfer multiple messages, we could just use concurrent composition to have !!C[NSL] ≤ !!F SC . However, the resulting protocol uses one instance of NSL per message, and -since NSL contains F PKI , another PKI for each message that is sent. This is clearly unrealistic. To get rid of this overhead we want to have all the instances of SC to jointly use just one key exchange F KE , i.e., we want to use the previously mentions joined state technique here. Towards this goal we model a wrapper protocol KE * which uses one key exchange to emulate multiple key exchanges (from a key k it derives session keys hash((sid , k)) where sid is the session id). Formally, we define KE * as follows and then show KE * ≤ !!F KE . Definition 7.7:
This proof is the only one in this paper in which we could not outsource all proofs that actually involve the details of the cryptographic primitives to Proverif. This is because Proverif cannot understand !! x , and the lemma relies on the fact that !! x ensures that no two processes with the same session id are created.
Analogously to the single session case we define a suitable context C * by replacing F ′ KE in KE * with and have Lemmas 4.8, 4.9) . Hence
Finally, we have a protocol which realizes multiple secure channels while invoking the NSL protocol and using only one PKI.
VIII. VIRTUAL PRIMITIVES
In this section, we present a technique for deriving security of protocols in the symbolic UC model that is specific to the symbolic model. No analogue in the computational world seems to exist. The idea is the following: When constructing UC secure protocols, it is often necessary to include specific "trapdoors" that allow the simulator to extract or modify certain information. For example, when constructing a simulator for a commitment scheme, we need to include in the protocol some way for the simulator to extract the value of the commitment when given a commitment by the environment (extractability), or to change the content of a commitment when producing a commitment for the environment (equivocality), see [14] . These additional trapdoors often make the protocols more complex, and they often also need more complex cryptographic primitives. A simple commitment protocol in which the committer just sends hash(m, r) for message m and randomness r is not UC secure because the simulator cannot extract or equivoke. Instead, one would need to assume a special hash function that takes an additional parameter crs (the common reference string) hash(crs, m, r) in such a way that given a suitably chosen "fake" crs, one can find collisions in hash or extract m from hash(crs, m, r). With such a hash function, one can construct a UC secure commitment relatively easily (see Definition 8.3 below). However, now our protocol uses a considerably more complex primitive than a simple hash function. And certainly common hash functions such as SHA-3 do not have these properties. This leads to a strange situation: We have a protocol that we can only prove secure using a hash function that has additional weaknesses (namely that given a "bad" crs, one can cheat). One might be tempted to state that if the protocol is secure for such weak hash functions, it should in particular be secure for good hash functions. Unfortunately, such reasoning does not work in the computational setting: We cannot just remove the existence of trapdoors from the hash function -if we do so, we have a completely different hash function and our security proof makes no claims about that function.
In the symbolic world, things are different. Here it turns out that we can indeed first analyze a protocol using a hash function with trapdoors, and then remove these trapdoors in a later step, still preserving security. We call this approach the "virtual primitives" approach, because we use primitives (in this example a hash function with trapdoors) that do not need to actually exist, and that are removed in the final protocol.
In a nutshell, the virtual primitives approach when trying to realize a functionality F (e.g., a commitment) works as follows:
• First, identify a symbolic model M real containing cryptographic primitives (e.g. a hash function) that should be used in the final protocol.
• Extend M real by additional constructors, destructors, or equality rules, call the resulting model M virt . The extension M virt should be "safe" in the sense that in M virt an adversary will have at least as much power as in M real (this will be made formal in Section VIII-B).
• Design a protocol P . Show that P emulates F with respect to M virt .
• Compose P with other protocols, leading to a complex protocol
where G is some desired final goal, e.g., some cryptoheavy voting protocol.
• Property preservation guarantees that any property ℘ that holds for G also holds for C[P ] (with respect to M virt ). Since M virt only makes adversaries stronger, ℘ also holds for C[P ] with respect to M real .
• Summarizing, we have constructed a protocol C[P ] in a modular way such that C[P ] uses the symbolic model M real (without any trapdoors) and has all the security properties of the functionality G. The virtual primitive approach is not limited to commitments. But in the following sections, we illustrate it in the case of a commitment protocol. Note however, that the main theorem that allows us to conclude that M virtsecurity implies M real -security is formulated for general safe extensions.
A few words are in order why the virtual primitives approach works in the symbolic setting. What is the specific property of the symbolic model -in contrast to the computational one -that makes it possible? In our interpretation, this is due to the fact that a primitive (like hashes) in the symbolic world is a concrete object (i.e., a particular constructor with certain reduction rules and equalities) while in the computational world it is a class of objects (hash functions) that are described by some negative properties ("functions such that the adversary cannot. . . "). Therefore in the symbolic world, it is possible to formally compare executions using different kinds of a primitive (e.g., hashes with and without trapdoors); executions in one setting can be mapped into executions in the other setting by rewriting the terms sent around. In contrast, in the computational setting, this is not possible: a security result for hash functions with trapdoors has no implications for hash functions without trapdoors -these two are completely different mathematical functions on bitstrings, and it is not possible to rewrite an execution that uses one hash function into an execution using another (in particular if the adversary makes his actions depend on individual bits of the hashes). This difference between the symbolic and the computational setting seems to be the reason why virtual primitives work in the symbolic setting.
A. Realizing commitments
For simplicity, we formulate a commitment functionality where the adversary is not informed that a commitment takes place (when both Alice and Bob are honest). Of course, such a functionality can only be realized if we assume perfectly secure channels between Alice and Bob that do not even allow the adversary to notice or block messages. If our protocols were to use secure channels where the adversary can notice and block communication, we would instead realize a somewhat weaker functionality which notifies the adversary 7 (the resulting changes in the proof are orthogonal to the issues of this chapter). Definition 8.1 (Commitment):
Symbolic model. The symbolic model M real has constructors hash/2, empty/0, and (·, ·) (pairs) -f /n means f has arity n -, has destructors fst, snd , has no equalities, and has the rewrite rules for fst, snd , equals prescribed by Definition 2.1. This model M real is quite standard and does not use any cryptography except hash functions (hash is binary for convenience only).
As explained above, to construct UC-secure commitments, we need additional "trapdoors" in our equational theory. Let M virt be the symbolic model M real with the following additions: Constructors fake/3, fakeH /2, crseqv /1, crsext/1, destructor extract/2, equation hash(crseqv (x n ), (x m , fake(x n , x m , x r ))) = E fakeH (x n , x r ), and rewrite rule extract(x n , hash(crsext(x n ), (x m , x r ))) → x m .
Notice that if we have a CRS crseqv (n) and know n, we can open fakeH (n, r) to arbitrary values. Similarly, if the CRS is crsext(n) and we know n, we can extract m from hash(crsext(n), (m, r)). These two facts allow us to construct a simulator that does equivocation and extraction.
Note that we introduced two different CRS-constructors for faking, crsext and crseqv . It would be tempting to use only one of them, i.e., use the equation hash(crs(x), (y, fake(x, y, z))) = E fakeH (x, z) and the reduction rule extract(x, hash(crs(x), (y, z))) → y.
But then
we would have for any terms k, m, r that extract(k, fakeH (k, r)) = E extract(k, hash(crs(k), (m, r))) → m, so by computing extract(k, fake(k, r)) the adversary can derive any term m, thus the adversary will know all secrets. This is clearly not a sensible symbolic model. The commitment protocol. The protocol we construct uses a crs, so we first need to define the crs functionality F CRS that gives a random non-secret value k to Alice, Bob, and the adversary. Definition 8.2 (Common reference string): F CRS := νk.io crsa k | io crsb k | net crs k .
Our protocol is then as expected. To commit to a message x m , Alice fetches the crs x crs , picks a random r, and sends h := hash(x crs , (x m , r)) to Bob. To unveil, Alice sends (x m , r), so that Bob can check whether h indeed contained these values. We call Alice's part of the protocol COM A and Bob's part COM B .
Definition 8.3 (Commitment protocol):
COM A := io crsa (x crs ).io coma (x m ).
νr. net 1 hash(x crs , (x m , r)) |io opena ().net 2 (x m , r)
COM B := io crsb (x crs ).net 1 (x h ). io comb |net 2 ((x m , x r )). 
}.
The proof of this lemma is given in the full version [7] , we only show the simulators (S, ϕ, n) for the three cases here:
(i) Uncorrupted case: S = νkr.net crs k . ϕ the identity. n = ∅. We show the corresponding observational equivalences by a sequence of rewriting steps on the protocol, interspersed with automated Proverif proofs for the steps that actually involve the symbolic model (i.e., we do not have to manually deal with the complex symbolic model M virt ).
B. Removing the virtual primitives
In this section, we will consider different symbolic models. Since the relation symbols →, ⇓, ≈, ↓, = E etc. do not explicitly specify the symbolic model, we use the following convention: When referring to a symbolic model M i , we write → i , ⇓ i , ≈ i , ↓ i , = Ei etc. We say a term (or destructor term) is an M-term (or M-destructor term) if it contains only constructors (and destructors) from M. We call a process an M-process if it contains only M-terms and Mdestructor terms.
We have now shown that COM is a secure commitment protocol with respect to M virt . However, we would like to deduce security of protocols using COM with respect to M real . For this, we first need to formalize what it means that M virt is a safe extension of M real : Definition 8.5 (Safe extension) : We call a symbolic model M 1 = (Σ 1 , E 1 , R 1 ) a safe extension of a symbolic model M 2 = (Σ 2 , E 2 , R 2 ) iff the following holds: 
